Bioinformatics and biological reality  by Johansson, Ingvar
www.elsevier.com/locate/yjbin
Journal of Biomedical Informatics 39 (2006) 274–287Bioinformatics and biological reality
Ingvar Johansson *
The Institute for Formal Ontology and Medical Information Science (IFOMIS), Saarland University, Germany
Received 5 July 2005
Available online 15 September 2005Abstract
Many bioinformaticians seem to shy away from believing that we can have knowledge about a mind-independent biological reality.
This paper attempts to show that this tendency is neither well-founded nor harmless. Even though most bioinformaticians work only
with terms and concepts, they cannot altogether disregard the question whether these terms and concepts have any real referents.
The paper consists of three parts. Part I clariﬁes three diﬀerent positions in the philosophy of science with which it would be good
for the philosophical outlook of bioinformaticians to become familiar, and it defends one of them, Karl Poppers epistemological realism.
Part II discusses a distinction which is necessary for epistemological realism and is of practical importance for bioinformatics, the dis-
tinction between the use and mention of terms and concepts. Part III, ﬁnally, contains some brief concluding words about realism, both in
general and in relation to bioinformatics.
 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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course of many conferences and workshops concerned with philosophy
and informatics. The conference ‘‘Ontology and Biomedical Informatics’’
in Rome, 29 April–2 May 2005 ﬁnally triggered me to make these thoughts
as clear as possible—even to myself. Both biasism (but not Myrdals) and
Vaihingers ﬁctionalism were, quite independently of me, put on the
agenda in Rome by Alexa McCrays talk ‘‘Conceptualizing the World:
Lessons from History.’’1. Introduction
Many bioinformaticians seem to shy away, if not from
believing that there is a mind-independent biological reali-
ty, at least from believing that we can have knowledge
about such a reality. The aim of this paper is to try to elim-
inate this tendency towards epistemological anti-realism.
The paper consists of two main parts and a brief conclud-
ing part. Part I clariﬁes three diﬀerent positions in the phi-
losophy of science with which it would be good for the
philosophical outlook of bioinformaticians to become
familiar. When they are spelled out in some detail it be-
comes evident that these positions are mutually exclusive,
but when seen only vaguely, the false impression may arise
that one can sometimes rely philosophically on one posi-
tion and sometimes on another. I will label them ‘‘Myrdals
Biasism’’, ‘‘Poppers Epistemological Realism’’, and ‘‘Vaih-1532-0464/$ - see front matter  2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jbi.2005.08.005
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E-mail address: ingvar.johansson@ifomis.uni-saarland.de.ingers Fictionalism’’, respectively.1 I will defend Poppers
position. Part II infuses new blood into the common
semantic distinction between the use and mention of terms
and concepts;2 both the red and the white blood corpuscles
in this new ﬂuid come from the philosophy of intentional-
ity. The view here defended both underpins the epistemo-
logical realism defended in part I, and shows that this
realism is not only important for bioinformaticians philo-2 I will deny my own preferences and use ‘‘term’’ and ‘‘concept’’ instead
of ‘‘word’’ and ‘‘meaning’’, respectively, in order to conform to the usage
of bioinformaticians. To a non-Platonist philosopher such as myself, the
term ‘‘concept’’ suggests too many allusions to entities that exist in some
extratemporal realm of their own, independently of human beings.
‘‘Meaning’’, on the other hand, has no such associations. Meanings exist
directly only in people.
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relevance for their ordinary work.
2. Part I
2.1. Myrdals biasism
Now and then we think of, and even perceive, the world
in a way that is closer to how we would like it to be than
how it really is. In such situations, we are biased. But
how often does this occur? And what are the consequences
of such bias for scientiﬁc research? One position in the phi-
losophy of science can be captured by the following thesis
and proposal:
• Thesis: Every conceptualization and theory is biased.
• Proposal: Admit that you are biased and make the caus-
es of this bias (valuations, social positions and back-
grounds, etc.) explicit, both to yourself and to your
readers.
This position, nowadays widespread, was ﬁrst put for-
ward in the ﬁfties by the economist Gunnar Myrdal (who
shared the Nobel Prize in economics with Friedrich Hayek
in 1974), but only as a thesis about conceptualizations in
the social sciences [1–3, Chapter 7]. Myrdals views quickly
reached the general philosophical audience thanks to Ern-
est Nagels criticism of them in his classic The Structure of
Science [4].
At the time Myrdal was writing, it was commonly as-
sumed that scientists in their research activities ought to
be, and mostly were, neutral with respect to valuations
and values that are not purely scientiﬁc in the way some
methodological norms are.3 In criticism of this assumption,
Myrdal claimed (a) that it is impossible for social scientists
to free themselves from all such valuations, and (b) that
such valuations necessarily distort research. According to
Myrdal, since the value-neutral social scientist is a myth,
social science is always more or less biased and more
haunted by conﬂicts than the natural sciences are, and
the only thing that scientists can do to become more objec-
tive is to ﬁnd out and clarify, both for themselves and their
readers, what kind of valuations they have. Looking at the
historical development of the natural sciences, one might
then add that even though there is much scientiﬁc consen-
sus among natural scientists at most points in time, there is
nonetheless a great divide between natural scientists
belonging to diﬀerent epochs (contrast Europe, for exam-
ple, at the times of Newton and Einstein). Such diﬀerences,
it has been argued, are due not to the discovery of new facts
but to the diﬀerent cultural values of the centuries and sci-
entists in question. In this way, many people have moved
from Myrdals own biasism, which is restricted to the social3 Myrdal prefers the term ‘‘valuations’’, since he thinks that the term
‘‘values’’ gives rise to misleading associations of being something
objective; see [2, p. 8].sciences, to the generalized version, which applies to all sci-
ences that are not purely formal. Logic and mathematics
are mostly regarded as being outside the scope of biasism,
but I have seen no claim that bioinformatics should be so
regarded.
As I will show, biasism (in whatever version) contains at
least three serious philosophical ﬂaws, each of which is suf-
ﬁcient reason to reject it.
Flaw 1.
It makes no sense to speak of something being to the
right if there is nothing that can be said to be to the left;
similarly, it makes no sense to speak of bias if it cannot
be contrasted with truth. Biasism does not in Myrdals
writings, and cannot without losing its sense, take the con-
cept of truth wholly away. What it does do is to claim that
we cannot know truths and that we should therefore speak
of research results as being true-for-certain-valuations in-
stead of being just true.
Biasism does not say that sometimes scientists are biased
and put forward research results that are distorted and
therefore false. The claim of biasism is that this is always
the case; either only in the social sciences (the restricted
thesis) or in all the non-formal sciences (the general thesis).
Let me compare biasism in science with issues of legal juris-
diction. Judicial procedure seeks to ﬁnd non-biased judges
and jury members. If biasism were applied to such proce-
dures, it would amount to the claim that there are no
non-challengeable persons at all. Because of this generality,
the thesis of biasism has to be applied to itself. It then im-
plies the following disjunction: Either biasism is false or it
is true, but in the latter case it says of itself that it is biased
and therefore false. That is, it is necessarily false. There-
fore, of course, it should not be adhered to.
However, the self-referential paradox of biasism can be
taken away. The defenders of biasism merely have to claim
that their thesis lies outside the harmful inﬂuences of valu-
ations and that they, therefore, are in a position to state a
known truth: ‘‘All theories are biased, except the theory of
biasism.’’ But now another problem rears its head. They
have to explain why their thesis—a thesis which belongs
to the sociology of knowledge—is, in contradistinction to
all other scientiﬁc and philosophical hypotheses, not inﬂu-
enced by valuations. If their thesis really is true, then it
seems to be a mystery why not also scientiﬁc assertions
of other sorts can be true. As far as I know, no one has
solved this problem; I think it is unsolvable.
There are at least two reasons why many otherwise good
researchers do not notice the paradoxical character of bia-
sism. First, it seems to be natural for people who make
assertions such as ‘‘Humans are always fools’’ and ‘‘Hu-
mans are always liars’’ to place themselves outside the
scope of what they say; if not altogether, at least at the mo-
ment of making the assertion. Those who have asserted
‘‘Humans are always biased’’ might have followed this hab-
it without noticing it. Second, in the case in hand, it is easy
to make a so-called fallacy of composition. That is, from
the fact that something is possible in each case, one falsely
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thing is possible in all cases taken collectively. Obviously,
from the fact that in a marathon race each starting runner
may win, one cannot validly draw the conclusion that all
runners may win. Similarly, but less obviously, from the
fact that each scientiﬁc hypothesis may be biased, one can-
not by means of mere logic draw the conclusion that all sci-
entiﬁc hypotheses may be biased.
Flaw 2.
The biasist proposal says that scientists should make the
causes of their biases explicit, but according to the biasist
thesis, even such a presentation of ones bias must itself
be biased and therefore false. Why? Because to state what
has caused ones bias is as much to put forward a hypoth-
esis as other empirical assertions are. According to the the-
sis, it must be impossible to know what the true causes of
ones bias are. If biasism is true, researchers do not only
automatically get a distorted view of what they study, they
also get a distorted view of what has caused their distorted
research results. There are, so to speak, distortions all the
way down. Therefore, it would be vain to follow the biasist
proposal.
However, as in relation to the ﬁrst ﬂaw, the defenders of
biasism may attempt to bypass this self-referential oddity
by qualifying their position. Confronted by this second
curiosity of their position, they may claim that their pro-
posal makes good sense since researchers are less biased
when they try to ﬁnd truths about the causes of their bias,
than they are when they try to ﬁnd other scientiﬁc truths.
For instance, it may rhetorically be asked: Isnt it easier
for an economist to ﬁnd out what his sex, ethnicity, social
background, and social valuations are than to ﬁnd out
how, in some respect, the market works?
I have two counter-remarks. The relevant problem is
much harder than merely discovering facts about ones so-
cial position and background. The real problem is to dis-
cover what causes distortions in ones own research. In
such an undertaking, one has also to take into account
the fact that sometimes people with the same social posi-
tion and background have diﬀerent opinions. Furthermore,
and more decisive, is the fact that this qualiﬁcation breaks
the biasist frame. If there are degrees in the way researchers
are biased, there are degrees of distortion in research re-
sults; and if there are degrees of distortion, there are de-
grees of being true or false, i.e., degrees of being
‘‘truthlike’’ (to anticipate the section on Poppers realism
below). But if there are such diﬀerences of degree of distor-
tion between ordinary hypotheses and hypotheses about
factors that cause bias, then there seems to be no reason
why one should not be able also to detect such diﬀerences
in truthlikeness between ordinary hypotheses.
The critique that I have presented so far takes seriously
the fact that biasism puts forward an all-embracing thesis,
which, in eﬀect, replaces the notion of ‘‘true’’ with the no-
tion of ‘‘true-for-certain-valuations’’, which, in turn, can
ground notions such as ‘‘true-for-us’’ and ‘‘true-for-them’’.
Such a replacement leads, as I have pointed out, to incon-sistencies. This criticism, it has to be noted, by no means
implies that we are never justiﬁed in talking about bias in
science. In local cases, and having recourse to the notion
of truth, we seem now and then to be justiﬁed in asserting
that some scientists have been biased. Local accusations of
bias must be kept distinct from biasism, which contains a
universal thesis.
For several decades now, biasism has come rather spon-
taneously to many researchers and people with academic
backgrounds. One causal factor behind this fact might be
the following. Nowadays, a large number of people in Wes-
tern societies earn their living performing research or re-
search-like activities in which the ﬁnal research report
takes the form of a consensus statement written by a group.
This is true of public commissions of inquiry, be they initi-
ated by the state or some regional or local authority; it is
true of research departments in big ﬁrms; and of the man-
agements of many research institutes. In such groups, after
the research is performed, there comes a phase in which the
ﬁnal results are negotiated. This process can easily convey
the false impression that there are no truths at all, only
negotiations about truths and, therefore, only truths-for-
certain-valuations, truths-for-us, and truths-for-them. As
far as I can see, many bioinformaticians have a similar kind
of experience when they try to do justice to the advice and
opinions of experts in various domains of knowledge.
Flaw 3.
Let us imagine for a while that biasism has no self-refer-
ential problems. Nonetheless, another curiosity appears.
All research needs a regulative idea, something that tells
the researchers what to look for. Traditionally, the over-
arching regulative idea has been truth. This does not mean
that truth has to be in the center in every phase and corner
of research. For example, physicists now and then play
with possible solutions to some equations without, for
the moment, bothering about truth at all. Similarly, some
biologists may play with simulations of various biological
processes; and researchers in the humanities may play with
certain possible interpretations of texts. This means only
that there is even in these play-situations an indirect con-
nection with the discovery of real natural laws and physical
facts, the discovery of real biological processes, and the dis-
covery of true interpretations, respectively. Todays science
relies on a division of labor in which many parts have a
very indirect connection to experiments and observations.
This being noted, the third ﬂaw of biasism can be stated
as follows:
• Biasism wants science to get rid of the regulative idea of
truth, but it has no adequate alternative to oﬀer.
According to the biasist proposal, researchers should
admit that they are biased and make the causes of their bias
explicit. But if, as biasism asserts, we do not have access to
the truth, what is the purpose of this proposal? Since a ra-
tional person should not seek truth if he or she ﬁrmly be-
lieves that one cannot come any closer to it, the proposal
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tive idea of truth for the idea of truth-for-the-researchers-
valuations. The latter could be speciﬁed either as the idea
that researchers should try only to promote their long-term
interests or that they should in the course of their research
simply try to have as much fun as possible. Although such
a substitution has no logical ﬂaws, it amounts to a substi-
tution of science with something else. It implies, contrary to
Myrdals intentions, that researchers should be allowed
consciously to deviate from data and consciously to ignore
data that that they suspect are problematic given their val-
uations, as long as they are as frank as possible about what
these valuations are. In secret, individual researchers may
well have such goals, but these goals cannot possibly be
made the public goal of science. Who, for instance, would
fund researchers who say that they will use their research
money only in order to promote their own egoistical inter-
ests or only in order to have fun?
Note that the remarks just made are not at all concerned
with the question of how research problems within ones
discipline are chosen. Such choices can of course easily be
related to valuations and interests. This reminds us that
several factors may account for the popularity of biasism,
one of which is a conﬂation of the choice of a regulative
idea for ones research (truth, long-term subjective inter-
ests, short-term fun) with the choice of a research problem.
Another factor may be a neglect of the fact that all
researchers are confronted with what might be called an
existentialist situation and choice: Shall I primarily try to
ﬁnd the true solution to my problem, or shall I primarily
try to ‘‘ﬁnd’’ a result that promotes my interests, or shall
I primarily try merely to have fun? I call the choice ‘‘exis-
tentialist’’, since it is inevitably a personal choice that every
researcher has to make; it can be made consciously, half
consciously, or subconsciously, but it has to be made. I
write ‘‘primarily’’, since in the best of all possible research
worlds seeking truth, promoting ones interests, and having
fun can be realized by means of the same activity.
Yet another factor behind the popularity of the biasist
proposal, perhaps the most inﬂuential, is the fact that there
really is something to the proposal when it is viewed from
the perspective of the readers of research reports. However,
this requires that the proposal be put within a traditional
framework in which both the researchers and the readers
are seeking the truth—a fact which is not noted by the
adherents of biasism. In what way can someone who reads
a research report, and who is interested in the truth, be
helped by coming to know the valuations of the researchers
in question? On non-biasist premises, the answer is simple.
As soon as there is a division of labor in the knowledge
enterprise of a community, the sources of knowledge tradi-
tionally discussed in epistemology, namely reason and
observation, are complemented by trust (in people provid-
ing information) [5,6]. In order for laymen to accept knowl-
edge or information from researchers, and in order for
researchers to accept knowledge or information from other
researchers, the one without knowledge has to trust the onewith knowledge; in information science, knowledge engi-
neers normally trust the domain experts. Readers may be
helped in this trust issue if each researcher states: ‘‘Trust
me or not; I have done my best to ﬁnd the truth with ordin-
ary methodologies, but if you suspect that I have distorted
facts in order to further my interests, then I can tell you
that my sex, ethnicity, social backgrounds, and social valu-
ations are as follows: . . .’’ An imagined example, for sim-
plicitys sake not taken from biology, will make the point
more concrete.
Think of the following situation. Two diﬀerent investi-
gations have been made about the income distribution
for a certain kind of job. According to report A, the aver-
age income is 15% higher for men than that for women, but
according to report B it is 25%. The researcher behind re-
port A states that he is a male income statistician who
thinks that men ought to have higher salaries than women,
and that, in particular, a 15% diﬀerence is too little,
whereas the person behind report B states that she is a fe-
male statistician who thinks that men and women ought to
have the same salaries for the same kind of job, and that a
25% diﬀerence is far too much. Whose report should be
trusted? Both reports cannot be true, although both can
be false. In my opinion, if it is impossible to perform fur-
ther investigations of ones own, it is somewhat rational
to trust the person whose values one shares. There is thus
a kernel of truth in the biasist proposal that researchers
should make their valuations, social positions and back-
grounds, and so forth, visible, but this kernel has here been
placed within a context where traditional truth seeking is
taken for granted. That is, the researchers in the example
have asked themselves ‘‘What is the truth, and what are
the facts?’’, and their readers have asked themselves if the
researchers have really found the true income distribution.
A researcher who suspects that he (or she) unconsciously
distorts facts ought to make his (or her) investigation twice.
He should ﬁrst make it, so to speak, spontaneously, and he
should then work through it once more with the conscious
intention of trying to detect hitherto unconscious
distortions.
Conclusion. Neither researchers in biomedical informat-
ics nor in any other ﬁeld should try to understand their
work philosophically in terms of biasism.
2.2. Poppers epistemological realism
Outside the philosophy of science, Karl Popper is most
well known for his defense of democracy in The Open Soci-
ety and Its Enemies [7]. Within the philosophy of science he
is best known for his falsiﬁability criterion and for his advo-
cacy of fallibilism.
Fallibilism is the view that no presumed knowledge, not
even scientiﬁc knowledge, is absolutely certain. Poppers
falsiﬁability criterion consists in the thesis that scientiﬁc
hypotheses, but not metaphysical assertions, are falsiﬁable,
and that, therefore, scientists but not metaphysicians are
able to state in advance what empirical ﬁndings could make
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his falsiﬁability criterion to real work, Popper connects this
criterion with several other general methodological rules.
Here, however, I will present only his general epistemolog-
ical realism.4
As will become clear in what follows, I wholeheartedly
accept the central features of Poppers epistemological real-
ism, but I believe, and have argued, that his falisiﬁability
criterion and its concomitant rules have to be rejected
[11]. Thus Poppers general realism can be dissociated from
his methodological rules and from his views that there is a
gap between science and metaphysics as well as a criterion
for detecting this gap. In particular, I will highlight a no-
tion that is crucial to Poppers realism and which he verbal-
izes using three diﬀerent expressions: truthlikeness,
verisimilitude, and approximation to truth [9, Chapter 9].
This extremely important notion is unfortunately neglected
outside circles of Popper experts. In my opinion, the core
of Poppers epistemological realism can be captured by
the following thesis and proposal:5
• Thesis: Every conceptualization and theory almost cer-
tainly contains some mismatch between theory and real-
ity. (Compare Myrdal: Every conceptualization and
theory is biased.)
• Proposal: Seek truth but expect to ﬁnd truthlikeness.
(Compare Myrdal: Make your valuations, social posi-
tions and backgrounds, etc. visible.)
Poppers epistemological realism combines fallibilism
with the traditional idea that truth seeking has to be the
regulative idea of science. The key to this mix is the notion
of truthlikeness (verisimilitude, approximation to truth),
roughly that a statement can be more or less true. The intu-
ition behind this notion is easily captured. Look at the
three assertions (1) ‘‘The sun is shining from a completely
blue sky’’, (2) ‘‘It is somewhat cloudy’’, and (3) ‘‘It is rain-
ing’’; or at the assertions (1) ‘‘There are four blood groups
plus the Rh factor’’, (2) ‘‘There are four blood groups’’,
and (3) ‘‘All blood has the same chemical composition’’.
In either case, if the ﬁrst assertion is true, then the second
assertion has a higher degree of truthlikeness and approx-
imates truth better than the third one. This is not to say
that the second is more likely to be wholly true than the
third. The sentences ‘‘X is probably true’’ and ‘‘X probably
has a high degree of truthlikeness’’ express relations be-
tween an assertion X and its evidence, whereas the sentenc-4 This realism is best spelled out in [8, in particular in Chapters 1–4 and
10] and in [9, in particular in Chapters 2, 5, and 7–9]. His falsiﬁability
criterion and most of his methodological rules are put forward in [10].
5 Of course, an epistemological realism presupposes a philosophical–
ontological realism. With respect to the spatiotemporal world, Popper has
a kind of level ontology (with which I wholly agree), according to which
neither biological reality nor mental reality can be ontologically reduced to
lower levels. Also, he thinks that thought contents have a kind of objective
existence in what he calls the ‘‘Third World’’; material reality is the First
world and mental reality the Second World.es ‘‘X is true’’ and ‘‘X has a high degree of truthlikeness’’
express relations between the assertion X and facts (truth-
makers) in the world. The former sentences express eviden-
tial relations, the latter express semantic-ontological
relations;6 the idea of truthlikeness belongs to a correspon-
dence theory of truth.7
At the end of a line of all possible progressively better
and better approximations to truth, there is of course truth.
To introduce degrees of truthlikeness as a complement to
the simple opposition between true and false is a bit—but
only a bit—like switching from talking only about tall
and short people to talking about the numerical or relative
lengths of the same people. The diﬀerence is this. Length
corresponds both to real comparative and numerical con-
cepts, but there are no such concepts for verisimilitudes.
All lengths can be linearly ordered (and thus give rise to
a real comparative concept), and a general numerical dis-
tance measure can be constructed for them (which gives
us a quantitative concept). Popper thought that such con-
cepts and measures of degrees of truthlikeness could be
constructed, but like many others I think that the ensuing
discussion shows that this is impossible [12, Chapter 7].
That is, we have only a qualitative or semi-comparative
concept of truthlikeness. Some philosophers think that
such a concept of truthlikeness can be of no use [12, p.
198–9], but this is too rash a conclusion.
To demonstrate that even a semi-comparative concept
of truthlikeness can be useful and important, I will use
an analogy. We have no real comparative concept for geo-
metrical shapes, to say nothing of a quantitative concept
and measure. Nonetheless, we continue to use our qualita-
tive concept of shape; we talk about shapes, point to
shapes, and speak informally about similarities with respect
to shape. Sometimes we make crude estimates of similarity
with respect to shapes and are able on this basis to order a
small number of shapes linearly (shape A is more like B
than C, and A is more like shape C than D, etc.); we might
be said to have a semi-comparative concept. In my opinion,
such estimates and orderings of a small number of cases are
also suﬃcient to ground talk of degrees of truthlikeness.
In the same way that a meter scale cannot be used before
it has been connected to something external to it, a stan-
dard meter, so the concept of truthlikeness of theories can-
not be used until one has judged, for each domain in which
one is working, some theory to be the most truthlike one.
In this judgment, evidential relations, left out of account
in the deﬁnition of truthlikeness, stage a comeback. As I6 The possible conﬂation between being ‘‘truthlike’’ and being ‘‘prob-
ably true’’ comes more easily in some other languages. In German, for
instance, the corresponding terms are ‘‘wahrheitsa¨hnlich’’ (truthlike),
‘‘wahrscheinlich’’ (probable), ‘‘Wahrheit’’ (truth), and ‘‘wahr’’ (true).
7 The correspondence theory of truth says that the truth of an assertion
(truthbearer) consists in a relation to reality or in a correspondence with
facts (truthmakers). Note that there can be no degrees of ‘‘falsitylikeness’’;
there are no non-existent facts with which an assertion can be compared.
But, of course, one may use ‘‘being falsitylike’’ as a metaphor for having a
low degree of truthlikeness.
I. Johansson / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 39 (2006) 274–287 279have said, truthlikeness informally measures the degree of a
theorys correspondence with facts, not the degree of its
correspondence with evidence. Nonetheless, in order to
judge how close a theory comes to the facts, degrees of evi-
dence must somewhere come into play. Note that such
judgments are commonplace decisions even for biasists
and social constructivists. They are made every time some
course book in some discipline is chosen to tell students
some facts.
The notion of truthlikeness is epistemologically very
important. The history of science tells us that it is no longer
possible to believe that science progresses by adding one bit
of truth to another in the way brick houses are built by lay-
ing bricks on top of each other. Whole theory ediﬁces have
often had to be revised, and new conceptualizations intro-
duced; this sort of development will probably continue for
a long time, perhaps forever. If, in this predicament, one
has recourse only to the polar opposition between true
and false, and is asked whether one believes that there
are any true theories, be it in the history of science, in to-
days science, or in the science of tomorrow, then one has
to answer ‘‘There are none’’. If, however, one has recourse
to the notion of truthlikeness, then one can answer as
follows:
There are so far no absolutely true empiricial theories,
but, on the other hand, there are not many absolutely
false theories either. Most theories in the history of sci-
ence contain some degree of truthlikeness, even if only
a very low degree. Today, however, some theories have
what is probably a very high degree of truthlikeness.
Why? Many modern inventions and modern standardized
therapies which are based on scientiﬁc theories have
proven extremely eﬀective. It seems highly unlikely that
all such inventions in technology and medicine are based
on theories with very low degrees of truthlikeness, to say
nothing of the thought that these theories are mere ﬁc-
tions (see next section) or ﬁgments of the imagination.
Think, for instance, of travel to the moon, images from
Pluto, computers, the internet, the GPS system, physio-
logic contraception, artiﬁcial insemination, and organ
transplantations.
It is now time to add a quotation from Popper in order
to show how he himself summarizes his views on
truthlikeness:
I have in these last sections merely sketched a
programme of combining Tarskis theory of truth with
his Calculus of Systems so as to obtain a concept of verisi-
militude which allows us to speak, without fear of talking
nonsense, of theories which are better or worse approxima-
tions to truth. I do not, of course, suggest that there can
be a criterion for the applicability of this notion, any more
than there is one for the notion of truth. But some of us
(for example Einstein himself) sometimes wish to say such
things as that we have reason to conjecture that Einsteins
theory of gravity is not true, but that it is a better approx-
imation to truth than Newtons. To be able to say such
things with a good conscience seems to me a major desid-eratum of the methodology of the natural sciences [9, p.
335].
Just as in ethics there are people who only think in terms
of white or black and who always want to avoid nuance
and complication, so in science there are people who simply
like to think only in terms of true or false. Not many dec-
ades ago scientists thought of their research only in terms
of being certainly true; today, having familiarized them-
selves with the history of science, many—and especially
in domains like informatics—think of it only in terms of
being certainly false or certainly ﬁctional (see next section).
In neither of these positions—being certain that one has
truth on ones side, or laying no claims to truth at all—
must researchers fear criticism; but on fallibilist premises
researchers must.
Applying the notion of truthlikeness to the history and
future of science allows us to think of scientiﬁc achieve-
ments the way engineers think of technological achieve-
ments. If a machine functions badly, engineers should try
to improve it or invent a new and better machine; if a sci-
entiﬁc theory has many theoretical problems and empirical
anomalies, scientists should try to modify it or create a new
and more truthlike theory. As in engineering it is natural
and common to invent imperfect devices, it is in science
natural and common to create theories that turn out not
to be true. In both cases, however, there is an obligation
to try to improve on things, i.e., improve on problematic
machines and problematic theories, respectively. Also,
and for everybody, it is of course better to use existing tech-
nological devices than to wait for tomorrows, and it is bet-
ter to trust existing truthlike theories than to wait for the
science of tomorrow.
Most rules have exceptions. Perhaps bioinformaticians,
unlike scientists in other disciplines, need not bother about
the history of science or think through the conﬂict between
Popperian fallibilism and biasism? Isnt it enough for bioin-
formatics simply to systematize what the present-day ex-
perts in biology tell them? No, it is not. Biological
knowledge grows rapidly, and even a young discipline like
bioinformatics will no doubt soon have to revise some of its
achievements in light of new biological knowledge. In the
Gene Ontology (GO), this is taking place before our eyes.
The constructors of GO list for example what they call
‘‘obsolete molecular functions’’. In some cases, what is list-
ed would better have been called only ‘‘obsolete terms for
molecular functions’’, but in some cases the ‘‘obsolete
molecular function’’ is a biological structure that was ear-
lier wrongly ascribed a molecular function (e.g., amyloid
protein, azurin, and cell surface antigen). Neither biasism
nor ﬁctionalism (see next section) can make sense of such
a straightforward use of the term ‘‘obsolete’’, but Poppers
epistemological realism can.
2.3. Vaihingers ﬁctionalism
In the 1920s and 30s Hans Vaihingers book The Philos-
ophy of As-If [13] saw much success. In one way it is related
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which only sensations or sense-data exist; and in another
way it is related to the social constructivist trend of the pre-
vious decades, according to which everything in the world
is a social construction. The essence of his position is:
• Thesis: Absolute truth, if such there is, is not attainable.
(Compare Popper: There is absolute truth, but it is
probably not attainable.)
• Proposal: Regard your theories as referring to ﬁctions;
dont concern yourself with truth and falsehood. (Com-
pare Popper: Regard your empirical theories as referring
to the world; try to ﬁnd out if they are false.)
Vaihinger holds that there is only one kind of real entity,
the contents of our sensations (this is his positivist side).
Things and persons in the ordinary sense, matter and ener-
gy as spoken of in physics, and things in themselves as pos-
tulated by some philosophers, are all merely ﬁctions.
Nonetheless, there are reasons for us to live as if many of
these latter kinds of entities are real; the expression ‘‘live
as-if X exists’’ which is at the heart of Vaihingers philoso-
phy should be understood as follows:
• If there were Xs and we knew it, then we would have to
expect some speciﬁc things to happen, and we would
have to act in some speciﬁc ways. In fact, however, we
know that there are no Xs. Nonetheless we ought to cre-
ate expectations and act as if there are Xs.
In some parts of his book, Vaihinger makes clear dis-
tinctions between (i) ‘‘hypotheses’’ (which are directed to-
wards reality and demand veriﬁcation), (ii) ‘‘semi-
ﬁctions’’ (which abstract away some known features of
an entity, as for example the irrationality of humans is
abstracted away in the concept of ‘‘homo oeconomicus’’),
and (iii) ‘‘pure ﬁctions’’ (which are based on no abstraction
of this sort); but in the end he turns everything (except the
contents of sensations) into pure ﬁctions and says:
we are able ultimately to demonstrate that what we gen-
erally call truth, namely a conceptual world coinciding
with the external world, is merely the most expedient
error. [. . .] So-called agreement with reality must ﬁnally
be abandoned as a criterion [13, p. 108].
He stresses the importance and necessity of postulating
ﬁctions in all areas of life, practical, scientiﬁc, as well as
ethical. Like most modern Anglo-American social con-
structivists, he implicitly takes it for granted that we can
communicate with each other about such ﬁctions, in other
words, he implicitly regards communication as real.8 Since
sensational contents play a subordinate role in his philoso-8 It should be noted that some French post-structuralists, e.g., Derrida,
even regard the idea of communication as a ﬁctional idea; nonetheless,
they communicate this thesis in many books.phy, it is no accident that his ideas can be summarized in
such a way that they become, as here, lumped together with
those of present day social constructivists.
It is interesting to note how similar Vaihingers and Pop-
pers theses are and, despite this, how dissimilar their pro-
posals are. In my opinion, the small diﬀerence between
their theses is of no importance at all. Even if Vaihinger
had subscribed to the view that there is some low probabil-
ity that absolute truth is attainable, I am sure that he would
have put forward the same ﬁctionalist proposal. Converse-
ly for Popper, even if he had thought that absolute truth is
in principle unattainable, he would still have put forward
the same falsiﬁcationist proposal. What, then, makes Vaih-
inger and Popper diﬀer so radically in their proposals? In
short, my answer is: Vaihingers lack of the notion of
truthlikeness.
False and ﬁctional assertions are in one respect diﬀerent
and in another similar. They are diﬀerent in that it is possible
to tell a lie using a false assertion but not using a ﬁctional
one.When we lie we present as true an assertion that is false,
but ﬁctional assertions are beyond the ordinary true–false
dimension. The two are similar in that neither refers to any-
thing in reality that corresponds exactly to the assertion in
question. A false empirical assertion lacks as a matter of fact
a truthmaker, and a ﬁctional assertion cannot possibly have
one. Therefore, it is easy to confuse the view that all theories
are false with the view that all theories are about ﬁctions.
Nonetheless, it is astonishing how easily Vaihinger moves
from speaking about theories as being false to speaking
about theories as being about complete ﬁctions. Why does
he not believe that there can be degrees of ﬁctionality? There
is a gulf neither between his semi-ﬁctions (or ‘‘idealiza-
tions’’) and pure ﬁctions nor between his semi-ﬁctions and
hypotheses; and Vaihinger never tries to prove that there
is. Obviously, but not noted by Vaihinger, the less that has
been abstracted away in a semi-ﬁction, the closer an asser-
tion about it is to a hypothesis, and the more that has been
abstracted away, the closer an assertion about it is to a pure-
ly ﬁctional assertion. Assertions about semi-ﬁctions might
be said to be semi-true, and since being semi-true takes de-
grees, we have only created another name for truthlikeness.
If one assertion is more truthlike than another, then it is
by deﬁnition also less false. However, this ‘‘falsity content’’
(to take an expression from Popper) can easily be turned
into a ‘‘ﬁctionality content’’, whereupon the more truthlike
assertion can also be said to be a less ﬁctional assertion.
When we are reading about, say, Sherlock Holmes, we have
no diﬃculty in placing this ﬁctional character in a real set-
ting, London between 1881 and 1904. In many ﬁctional dis-
courses not everything is ﬁctional, and we often have no
diﬃculty in apprehending such mixtures of real and ﬁction-
al reference. Something similar is true when one reads about
the history of science. For example, when I read about the
false hypothesis that there is a planet Vulcan between Mer-
cury and the Sun, which might explain some seeming falsi-
ﬁcations of Newtonian mechanics, then I had no problem in
taking Vulcan to be a ﬁctional entity postulated as existing
9 I do not regard the distinction between use and mention as the same
distinction as that between object language and meta-language. The use-
mention distinction does not split ordinary language into distinct levels.
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Holmes to be a ﬁctional character in a real London. When
I read about the false hypothesis that there is a chemical
substance, phlogiston, which exits burning material (where
in truth, as we now know, oxygen enters burning material),
then I have no problem in taking phlogiston to be a ﬁctional
substance in the world of real burnings. When I read about
Galens view that (what we call) the arterial system contains
pneuma or spiritus, then I have no problem in taking this
pneuma to be ﬁctional, but the arterial system to be real.
Those who write about the history of science often make
the reader look upon statements which were once false
assertions as being assertions about ﬁctions. In retrospect,
we should look upon superseded theories as containing
unintentionally a mix of reality and ﬁction in the way reality
and ﬁction can be intentionally mixed in novels. This is to
give ﬁctions their due place in science, but such local uses
of ﬁctions must be kept distinct from ﬁctionalism, which
contains a universal thesis.
Fictionalism has, it should also be noted, one major ﬂaw
in common with biasism. Apart from all other curiosities,
ﬁctionalism is self-reﬂectively inconsistent. Fictions are cre-
ated, but if everything apart from the contents of our sen-
sations is a ﬁction, then there is nothing except such
content that can create the ﬁctions. However, contents of
sensation do not have such a capacity. Unfortunately,
Vaihinger and most ﬁctionalists do not see the need for this
kind of self-reﬂection.
The fact that Poppers epistemological realism is far
more reasonable than biasism and ﬁctionalism does not im-
ply that it is completely free from problems and philosoph-
ical lacunae. Popper was not, for instance, interested in the
philosophy of language. In the next part of the paper, I will
put forward a semantic idea that not only underpins epis-
temological realism, it is also of direct relevance for some
seemingly non-philosophical work in bioinformatics.
3. Part II
3.1. Use and mention—in the light of an optical metaphor
When we look at things such as stones, trees, and walls,
we cannot see what is on the other side. But things like
water and glass are such that we can look through them
to the other side. In the case of glasses, microscopes, and
telescopes, this feature is extremely useful. By looking
through such lenses, we are able better to look at something
else. This phenomenon of ‘‘being-aware-of-x-through-y’’ is
not restricted to the visual sense. It can be found in the tac-
tile realm as well. You can grip a tool and feel the tool
against your palm, but when you are very good at using
such a tool, this feeling disappears. You are instead primar-
ily aware of whatever it is that the tool is aﬀecting. For in-
stance, when you are painting a wall with a brush, you are
only (if at all) indirectly aware of your grip of the brush,
and are instead aware only of what you are painting.
You are feeling through the brush and feeling (at) the wall.What glasses are for people with bad sight, the white cane
is for blind people.
Speech acts, listening acts, writing acts, and reading
acts—in short, language acts—are, just like glasses and
the white cane, tools for improving everyday life. They
can be used to convey and receive information, to give
and take orders, to express emotions, and to do many other
things. Even though language acts do not have the same ro-
bust material character that tools have, they nonetheless
display the same feature of being able to be both ‘‘looked
at’’ and ‘‘looked through’’. When you look at linguistic
entities, you are directly aware of them as linguistic entities,
but when you look through them you are at most indirectly
aware of them. When, for example, you are conveying or
receiving information in a language in which you are able
to make and understand language acts spontaneously,
you are not looking at the terms, concepts, statements,
and propositions in question; nor are you looking at gram-
mar and dialects. Rather, you look through these linguistic
entities in order to see the information (facts, reality, ob-
jects) in question. When, then, are we looking at linguistic
entities? We look at them, for example, when we are read-
ing dictionaries and are examining terminologies. If I say
‘‘Look, the cat has fallen asleep’’, I want someone to look
through the term ‘‘cat’’ and my assertion in order to get
information about a state of aﬀairs in the world. But if I
say ‘‘In WordNet, the noun cat has 8 senses’’ [14], then
I want someone to look at the term ‘‘cat’’.
My distinction between looking at and looking through
is similar to the traditional distinction between the use and
mention of linguistic entities,9 and it applies both to factual
talk and to reading novels. In ﬁctional discourse, terms are
used as much as they are in talk about real things, but they
are used in a very special way. Fictional discourse is about
ﬁctional characters; it is not about terms and concepts. In
fact, we are standardly using the same terms and concepts
both in ﬁctional and factual discourse.
When you are not using lenses, you can look at them
and investigate them as material objects of their own in
the world. For instance, you can try to ﬁnd out what their
physical properties and internal structures are like. In the
world of practice, we investigate tools this way only when
they are not functioning properly and are in need of repair-
ing. Something similar holds true of terms and concepts.
Only when our language acts are not functioning well—
think for instance of learning a new language—do we nor-
mally bother to look at terms and concepts in dictionaries.
Furthermore, we are able to switch quickly between
looking through and looking at things. Car drivers should
look through, not at, the windshield, but when driving they
should also have the ability to take a very fast look at it in
order to see whether, for instance, it has been damaged by
a stone. Something similar is true of people using a foreign-
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a certain foreign term and then immediately start to look
through it by using it. Let me summarize:
1. In the same way that we can both look at and look
through many material things, we can both look at
and look through many linguistic entities.
2. In the same way that we can quickly switch between
looking at and looking through glass, we can quickly
switch between looking at and looking through linguistic
entities. And let me then continue the analogy by adding
still another similarity:
3. In the same way that consciously invented material
devices for ‘‘being-aware-of-x-through-y’’, such as
microscopes and telescopes, have provided new informa-
tion about the world, consciously invented linguistic
devices for ‘‘being-aware-of-x-through-y’’, such as scien-
tiﬁc conceptual systems, have provided new information
about the world.
By means of the invention of new concepts, we can some-
times discover hitherto completely unnoticed facts. Often,
we (rightly) regard discoveries and inventions as wholly
distinct aﬀairs. Some things, such as stones, can only be
discovered, not invented; others, such as bicycles, seem
only to be inventions. One person might invent and build
a new kind of house, and other persons may later discover
it; but the ﬁrst person cannot both invent and discover it.
These diﬀerences between inventing and discovering not-
withstanding, devices for ‘‘being-aware-of-x-through-y’’
present an intimate connection between invention and dis-
covery. By means of new ‘‘being-aware-of-x-through-y’’
inventions, we can discover x. There are many xs that
we can discover only in this way.
The third point above should partly be understood in
terms of the notion of truthlikeness: If an existing concep-
tual system is confronted by a conﬂicting conceptual sys-
tem which has a higher degree of truthlikeness, the latter
should supersede the former. But the notion of truthlike-
ness should also be understood by means of the distinction
between looking at and looking through. I introduced the
idea of truthlikeness with the three assertions ‘‘The sun is
shining from a completely blue sky’’, ‘‘It is somewhat clou-
dy’’, ‘‘It is raining’’, and I said that, given that the ﬁrst
assertion is true, the second one seems intuitively to be
more truthlike than the third. A standard objection to such
a thesis is that this sort of comparison can show us nothing
relevant for a correspondence theory of truth,10 since what
we are comparing are merely linguistic entities, namely
assertions. However, this objection overlooks the distinc-
tion between looking at and looking through. Looking at
the assertions allows us to see only similarity relations be-
tween the assertions as such, but when we have learned to10 For a rough description of the correspondence theory of truth, see
footnote 7.switch from looking at them to looking through them—at
reality—then we can coherently claim that the second is
more truthlike than the third.
In the same way that our choice of kind of lens may
determine what we are able to see, so our choice of con-
cepts determines what we can grasp. Such a determination
is compatible with the view that we can get knowledge
about the world: it does not render truth a wholly social
construction. When, through a concept, we look at and
grasp something in the world, this concept often (i) selects
an aspect of the world, (ii) selects a granularity level (for
instance, microscopic or macroscopic), and (iii) creates
boundaries where there are no pre-given natural bound-
aries. Nonetheless, the concept (iv) does not create this as-
pect, this granularity level, or what is bounded. Think of
the concept ‘‘heart’’. It selects a biological aspect of the hu-
man body, it selects a macroscopic granularity level, and it
creates a boundary line between the heart and its surround-
ings which does not track physical discontinuities at all
points, as for example where the heart meets the aorta
and the veins [15]. But, nonetheless, our invention of the
concept ‘‘heart’’ does not create our hearts, and there were
hearts many millions of years before there were concepts.
3.2. The fallacy of mixing use and mention
All ontologies in information science contain terms. The
builders of such ontologies look mainly at the terms in
question, whereas the users of ontologies look mainly
through them. Like the users, the experts of the various do-
mains of knowledge generally look through the terms.
However, an ontology such as the online lexical resource
WordNet presents a special case, for (if it is to be called
an ontology at all) it is an ontology of terms and their
meanings not about what the terms are used to refer to;
it is like a dictionary, not like a taxonomical textbook.
With respect to the term ‘‘cat’’, WordNet (2.0) starts as fol-
lows: The noun ‘‘cat’’ has 8 senses in WordNet.
1. cat, true cat—(feline mammal usually having thick soft
fur and being unable to roar; domestic cats; wildcats).
2. guy, cat, hombre, bozo—(an informal term for a youth
or man; ‘‘a nice guy’’; ‘‘the guys only doing it for some
doll’’) [14].
It is doubly clear the term ‘‘cat’’ is mentioned and not
used in WordNet; it is looked at and not through. Both
the scare quotes around the term ‘‘cat’’ and the fact that
it is preceded by the term ‘‘noun’’ make it clear that Word-
Net contains no talk of real cats; both scare quotes and con-
text can disambiguate between use and mention. Here,
therefore, matters are clear. In many biomedical ontologies,
however, use and mention are systematically confused.
The group that constructed the Gene Ontology, the GO
Consortium, says that ‘‘[t]he Goal of the Consortium is to
produce a structured, precisely deﬁned, common, controlled
vocabulary for describing the roles of genes and gene prod-
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not an ontology for looking at terms but for looking through
terms. GO consists of three distinct ontologies, one for cellu-
lar components, one for molecular functions, and one for
biological processes. One graph in the latter ontology (as it
looks when this is being written in June 2005) can be repro-
duced as in the ﬁgure below; it is to be read from bottom
to top. The graph contains arrows that represent both sub-
sumption relations (is_a) and part-whole relations (part_of).a
ss
iGene_Ontology
part_ofbiological process
is_aphysiological process
is_ametabolism
is_anucleobase, nucleoside, nucleotide, and
nucleic acid metabolismis_a
transcriptionis_a
tr n cription, DNA-dependentpart_of
tran cr ption initiation (GO: 0006352)11 The quoted statement (as well as other ones in HL7 RIM) is criticized
in [18]. The terminology of the National Cancer Institute Thesaurus is
discussed in [19], and some of the critical remarks made here are concerned
also with the use-mention distinction.When a user of GO reads this he is, I am sure, looking
through the terms. That is, he reads it from the bottom up
as signifying something like: ‘‘Each transcription initiation
is part of a DNA-dependent transcription, which is a kind
of transcription, which is a special kind (nucleobase, etc.)
of metabolism, which, like all metabolisms, is a physiolog-
ical and biological process.’’ So far so good, but I have
stopped at ‘‘biological process’’. What about the last step?
Reading it in the same way would yield: ‘‘Each biological
process is part of the Gene Ontology’’? But this is obvious-
ly false. It should instead be read: ‘‘The term biological
process is part of the Gene Ontologys hierarchy of terms’’.
Thus use and mention of ‘‘biological process’’ are here
mixed. When one reads the ontology from the bottom up
and arrives at ‘‘biological process’’, this term should be
regarded as used, but when one continues reading upwards,
it should be regarded as mentioned.
Since most people are able to switch unproblematically
between looking through and looking at terms, the human
users of the GO may perhaps do so here without noticing,
and no harm will have been done. However, automated
information-extracting systems are not able to make such
switches. Obviously, GO would be a better construction
without this mixture of use and mention. As the graph
stands, it allows a fallacious inference to the eﬀect that if
something is a biological process then it is part of a certain
human artifact called the Gene Ontology. This might be
called the fallacy of mixing use and mention.
The same kind of fallacy appears as well (at least in June
2005) in Computer Retrieval of Information on ScientiﬁcProjects (CRISP). There, one ﬁnds subsumption relations
which can be represented as in the hierarchy below (to be
read from the bottom up).immunology
is_aantigen
is_aallergen
is_aairborne allergen
is_apollenHere, ‘‘antigen’’ should be used in relation to ‘‘allergen’’
(‘‘Each allergen is an antigen’’), but mentioned in relation
to ‘‘immunology’’ (‘‘The term antigen is an immunological
term’’). ‘‘Allergen’’ is a term among other terms in the ﬁeld
of immunology, whereas allergens themselves are among
the entities that immunology studies.
The Health Level 7 Reference Information Model (HL7
RIM) conﬂates use and mention, i.e., use and mention of
clinical data, with the unfortunate result that the users
are told that HL7 RIM cuts them oﬀ from the world:Act as statements or speech-acts are the only representa-
tion of real world facts or processes in the HL7 RIM.
The truth about the real world is constructed through a
combination (and arbitration) of such attributed state-
ments only, and there is no class in the RIM whose
objects represent ‘‘objective state of aﬀairs’’ or ‘‘real
processes’’ independent from attributed statements. As
such, there is no distinction between an activity and its
documentation. Every Act includes both to varying
degrees. For example, a factual statement made about
recent (but past) activities, authored (and signed) by
the performer of such activities, is commonly known as
a procedure report or original documentations (e.g.,
surgical procedure report, clinic note, etc.) [17, italics
added].11
Let me now return to the confusion of use and mention
in GO. GOs three ontologies state at the root ‘‘biological
process part_of Gene_Ontology’’, ‘‘molecular function par-
t_of Gene_Ontology’’, and ‘‘cellular component part_of
Gene_Ontology’’, respectively. What to do in order to re-
move the inferences to the eﬀect that biological processes,
molecular functions, and cellular components belong to
the artifact Gene Ontology instead of to biological reality?
One solution—‘‘the multiple ontology solution’’—is for the
GO Consortium to take its talk of three ontologies literally
and to construe GO as having three top nodes instead of
one. For those cases where a single topmost node is needed,
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Entity’’ and write: ‘‘biological process is_a gene-ontologi-
cal entity’’, ‘‘molecular function is_a gene-ontological enti-
ty’’, and ‘‘cellular component is_a gene-ontological entity’’,
respectively. This way out I will call, after the author of
The Foundational Model of Anatomy (FMA), ‘‘the Corne-
lius Rosse solution’’. At the top of FMA, the four nodes
‘‘anatomical structure’’, ‘‘body substance’’, ‘‘body space’’,
and ‘‘anatomical boundary’’ are subsumed by the single
top node ‘‘Anatomical Entity’’ [20].
However, just as the multiple ontology solution has its
price, lack of a single top node, so also does the Rosse solu-
tion. For when we look through the terms ‘‘biological pro-
cess’’, ‘‘molecular function’’, ‘‘cellular component’’, and all
the terms they subsume, we ﬁnd entities in the world that
share a certain abstract feature (being a biological process,
etc.) quite independently of GO. This is not unproblemati-
cally the case whenwe look through the term ‘‘gene-ontolog-
ical entity’’. To describe something as being a gene-
ontological entity is merely to say, either tautologically that
it is an entity classiﬁed by the GO, or, more informatively,
that it is an entity of interest for gene research. That is, what
makes a cellular process a biological process, an organelle a
cellular component, and a catalytic activity a molecular
function is of another character than what makes cellular
processes, organelles, and catalytic activities into gene-onto-
logical entities. But there is here no confounding of use and
mention of terms—and most things in life do have a price.
3.3. Use and mention—in the light of a good philosophy of
intentionality
As I pointed out in Section 3.1, both terms (words) and
concepts (meanings), as they are most commonly used, are
invisible in the sense that we most often look through them
at the entities to which they refer. The need for a distinction
between term and concept arises as soon as we discover a
synonymy, be it between two terms in the same language
or in diﬀerent languages. For we then have to specify what
makes the terms diﬀerent and what makes them similar,
i.e., synonymous. The terms diﬀer because they are consti-
tuted by diﬀerent syntactic unities such as letters or words
conceived of as purely graphical or acoustic patterns, and
they are synonymous (as we say) because they express the
same concept. A term is a fusion of a syntactic unity and
a concept.12 One looks through the concept, not through
the syntactic unity, i.e., concepts are to terms what lenses
are to glasses, microscopes, and telescopes.
The metaphor of ‘‘looking through’’ concepts is sus-
tained by a certain approach in the philosophy of inten-12 Those who are amenable to Ferdinand de Saussures linguistics can
read the last sentence as follows: A sign is a fusion of a signiﬁer and what
is signiﬁed. Let me add that Saussure consciously abstracted all ‘‘looking-
throughs’’ and referents away from his studies. Some of his present-day
followers, however, seem to take the position (criticized in this paper) that
there simply are no referents.tionality. The term ‘‘intentionality’’ was introduced to
contemporary philosophy by Franz Brentano in the nine-
teenth century. It refers to phenomena such as perceiving,
thinking, reading, and desiring. Intentional phenomena
contain a directedness towards something. Mostly, it is a
directedness that originates in a person who is in a so-called
‘‘intentional state’’ (e.g., in a state of perceiving a certain
object), or who performs an ‘‘intentional act’’ (such as
asserting something). There are, however, diﬀerent opin-
ions on how to analyze intentional phenomena. In my
opinion, Edmund Husserl [21] and John Searle [22] have
come the closest to the truth.13 Let me quote Searle:it is at least misleading, if not simply a mistake, to say
that a belief, for example, is a two-term relation between
a believer and a proposition. An analogous mistake
would be to say that a statement is a two-term relation
between a speaker and a proposition. One should say
rather that a proposition is not the object of a statement
or belief but rather its content. The content of the state-
ment or belief that de Gaulle was French is the proposi-
tion that the de Gaulle was French. But that proposition
is not what the statement or belief is about or is directed
at. No, the statement or belief is about de Gaulle [22, p.
18–9]
Intentional phenomena are marked by a tripartition be-
tween (intentional) act, (intentional) content, and (inten-
tional) object. Assume that you are reading a physicians
report about your heart, which tells you that your heart
has some speciﬁc features. At a particular moment, there is
then your reading act along with what you are reading
about, the intentional object, i.e., your heart and its proper-
ties. But since your heart exists outside of your reading act,
there must be something within the act itself in virtue of
which you are directed towards your heart and its properties.
This something is called the content; in assertions, it consists
of propositions. Even false assertions contain a proposition.
According to many non-Husserlian and non-Searlean
analyses of intentionality, you are in your act of reading
directed only towards the proposition, but then there is
outside your awareness also a relation of representation be-
tween the proposition (the content) and the object (your
heart). According to Husserl and Searle, on the other hand,
you are in your reading directed towards your heart (ob-
ject) by means of the proposition (content). The ﬁrst kind
of analysis leaves no room for any sensible talk of ‘‘looking
through’’ concepts and propositions, but Husserls and
Searles analyses do. Though Husserls and Searles philo-
sophical frameworks diﬀer in other respects,14 the overlap13 In this respect see Searle [22, p. 18–9, 57–61, 97], and Husserl [21, the
ﬁfth investigation, § 11 and the appendix to § 21] (‘‘Critique of the image-
theory and of the doctrine of the immanent objects of acts’’).
14 Searle is a naturalist in the sense that he thinks that everything that
exists exists in the spatiotemporal world in which we live. Husserl seems at
ﬁrst to have been a naturalist, but later he came to propound so-called
transcendentalist views.
15 With respect to the term ‘‘concept’’, I remind the reader of footnote 2
and ask her or him also to read [26].
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tion between looking at and looking through concepts can
be embedded within a very plausible theory of intentional-
ity. This gives further credence both to epistemological
realism in general and to epistemological realism in
bioinformatics.
4. Part III
4.1. The last word and the last word but one
In the ﬁrst part of this paper I advocated Poppers real-
ism, in particular his notion of truthlikeness. In the second
part I advocated a Husserl-Searlean analysis of intentional-
ity, in particular the view that in assertions one is directed
towards the world by ‘‘looking through’’ terms and con-
cepts. Social constructivists often ask: ‘‘From what posi-
tion are you talking?’’ In order to answer this question, I
will bring in still another great thinker, Thomas Nagel. I re-
gard myself as speaking from the kind of naturalist ration-
alist position that he has tried to work out in The View
From Nowhere [23] and The Last Word [24]. Below are
two quotations. The ﬁrst is from the introduction to the
latter book, and the second is its ending paragraph.
The relativistic qualiﬁer—‘‘for me’’ or ‘‘for us’’—has be-
come almost a reﬂex, and with some vaguely philosophical
support, it is often generalized into an interpretation of
most deep disagreements of belief or method as due to dif-
ferent frames of reference, forms of thought or practice, or
forms of life, between which there is no objective way of
judging but only a contest for power. (The idea that every-
thing is ‘‘constructed’’ belongs to the same family.) Since
all justiﬁcations come to an end with what the people
who accept them ﬁnd acceptable and not in need of further
justiﬁcation, no conclusion, it is thought, can claim validity
beyond the community whose acceptance validates it.
The idea of reason, by contrast, refers to nonlocal and
nonrelative methods of justiﬁcation—methods that distin-
guish universally legitimate from illegitimate inferences
and that aim at reaching the truth in a nonrelative sense.
Those methods may fail, but that is their aim, and rational
justiﬁcation, even if they come to an end somewhere, can-
not end with the qualiﬁer ‘‘for me’’ if they are to make that
claim [24, p. 4–5].
Once we enter the world for our temporary stay in it,
there is no alternative but to try to decide what to believe
and how to live, and the only way to do that is by trying
to decide what is the case and what is right. Even if we dis-
tance ourselves from some of our thoughts and impulses,
and regard them from the outside, the process of trying
to place ourselves in the world leads eventually to thoughts
that we cannot think of as merely ‘‘ours.’’ If we think at all,
we must think of ourselves, individually and collectively, as
submitting to the order of reasons rather than creating it
[24, p. 143].
Reason, Nagel says, has to have the last word. However,
this statement needs to be qualiﬁed. As the logician PerLindstro¨m notes with regard to Nagels book: ‘‘reason
has the last word—or perhaps only the last but one, since
reality, reason tells us, has always the absolutely last word’’
[25, p. 3–6].
4.2. Bioinformaticians and biologists
Not only for biologists, but even for bioinformaticians,
biological reality should have the last word. That is, bioin-
formaticians should ideally consult, and only consult, biol-
ogists who try to ‘‘consult’’ nature. What then does the
actual situation today look like? According to my experi-
ence, researchers in diﬀerent disciplines tend to adopt
diﬀerent philosophical positions. Bioinformaticians,
anthropologists, sociologists, cultural-studies-people, and
other researchers who work mainly with data assembled
in texts or interviews, tend towards various forms of anti-
realism; most biologists and natural scientists tend towards
both ontological and epistemological realism. According to
some indications, biologists who work only with computer
simulations tend towards anti-realism. Therefore, I will end
with some comments on some diﬀerent epistemological sit-
uations; situations which are doubly idealized. It is as-
sumed (a) that bioinformaticians and biologists not only
tend to adopt a certain epistemological position but in fact
wholeheartedly adopt one, and (b) that all bioinformati-
cians are either realists or anti-realists, and that the same
goes for all biologists. This gives rise to the following four
situations:(i) bioinformaticians are anti-realists and biologists are
realists;
(ii) both groups are realists;
(iii) bioinformaticians are realists and biologists are anti-
realists;
(iv) both groups are anti-realists.
In my opinion, situation (i) comes closest to the actual
situation today. Anti-realist bioinformaticians work with
data handed over to them by realist biologists. This does
not, happily enough, have the consequence that the infor-
mation systems so constructed are useless for realists who
want to look through the terms in question and at biolog-
ical reality. This is because, even though the bioinformati-
cians may have been looking only at the terms or at the
concepts and not at reality,15 the terms come originally
from domain experts who mainly looked through them at
biological reality. Therefore, the anti-realist bioinformati-
cians become intermediaries, which the realist user can
mostly forget. However, as I have pointed out in this paper,
some features of some information systems can be im-
proved if bioinformaticians became realists as well. Still
another thing makes it desirable that bioinformaticians be-
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biologists. Let me explain.
Since bioinformatics is more concerned with large-scale
systematic classiﬁcations than present-day biology normal-
ly is, bioinformaticians may well discover in classiﬁcations
inconsistencies, indeterminacies and other curiosities that
have escaped the notice of biologists. What to do in such
situations? If the bioinformaticians are realists, the natural
thing to do is to ask the biologists to ‘‘consult’’ nature
again (cf. [27]), but if they are anti-realists they can in prin-
ciple accept inconsistencies and indeterminacies, which
may after all reﬂect inconsistencies and indeterminacies in
the ways people ‘‘use language’’, and so forth .
Even though it seems highly unlikely that situation
(iii)—bioinformaticians are realists and biologists are
anti-realists—should ever become actual, I will use its mere
possibility to make two points clear. First, there might be a
gap between the public philosophical position of a
researcher and the way in which he or she actually conducts
research. A declared epistemological realist may actually
treat data as frivolously as if there were no theory-indepen-
dent reality to serve as standard for correctness, and, con-
versely, a declared anti-realist may in fact be just as careful
as a realist in trying to do justice to all the relevant data.
Second, if realist bioinformaticians meet anti-realist biolo-
gists of this kind, then they can look upon the latter as if
they were realists. They can do the opposite of what, in a
famous case, Osiander did.
Osiander is the man who wrote the preface to the realist
Copernicus treatise On the revolutions of the heavenly
spheres (1543). Here, Copernicus claimed, contrary to what
the Church at the time said, that the planets do not revolve
around the earth but around the sun. In his preface, how-
ever, Osiander said that the book should be read as saying
merely that the calculations of the orbits of ‘‘the heavenly
spheres’’ could be simpliﬁed if one regarded the world as
if it were such that the planets move around the sun.
Copernicus realist theory was reinterpreted by Osiander
as being a ﬁctionalist theory. But the opposite interpreta-
tional move is also possible. Something that is said to
describe something merely ﬁctional, or to be a mere social
construction, can be reinterpreted as in fact describing
something real. I have done such a reinterpretation when
reading some books in the humanities and the social scienc-
es in which the author pronounces him- or herself to be a
social constructivist. Realist bioinformaticians can make
it in relation to anti-realist biologists.
And ﬁnally, what would the world be like under (iv),
the philosophically worst of all possible scenarios, in
which both bioinformaticians and biologists are anti-real-
ists? Well, if their anti-realism were merely idle talk,
then, by deﬁnition, the world would continue very much
as if they were realists. But if their anti-realism deeply
inﬂuenced their practical work, this would be a true
disaster. Since bioinformatics includes medical informat-
ics and, as I have used the term ‘‘biologist’’, biologists
include physicians and medical researchers, I can makemy point clear by means of a rhetorical question: Would
you like to be treated for a physiological illness by a
physician who is not sure that there are human bodies,
and who uses information systems created by medical
information scientists who believe they are working only
with terms that lack real referents?
There are even those who proclaim death to be a social
construction. They are, thereby, proclaiming the death of
their own anti-realism.Acknowledgments
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